How does Section 300(d) of the Penal Code apply to dangerous driving?

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Section 300(d) can cover dangerous driving when the driver has the required “imminently dangerous” knowledge
Section 300(d) treats a fatal road collision as murder when the offender knows the driving is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits the act without any excuse for taking that risk. In William Tan Cheng Eng v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 244, the prosecution argued that “murder by car” could be made out where the accused knowingly engaged in driving that was imminently dangerous and likely to cause death. The key point is that it is not enough for the act to be dangerous; the prosecution must prove the accused’s knowledge at the time of driving beyond a reasonable doubt.
The legal threshold in Section 300(d turns on knowledge, not just danger
Section 300(d) applies where the person committing the act knows the conduct is “so imminently dangerous” that it must in all probability cause death, or bodily injury likely to cause death. The provision also requires that the act is done “without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury.” This ties murder liability to what the offender knew when driving, rather than only to the objective risk created by the driving.
In the 1970 “murder by car” case, the prosecution framed reckless driving as meeting Section 300(d)
In William Tan Cheng Eng v Public Prosecutor, the accused was charged with murder for causing the death of Ahmad bin Yassin, with the prosecution relying on the fourth clause of Section 300. The prosecution’s theory was that the accused’s manner of driving was so imminently dangerous that he knew it would, in all probability, cause death or bodily injury likely to cause death. The case was described as “murder by car” because the fatal outcome arose from the accused’s driving conduct.
The facts used to support “imminently dangerous” driving included a chain of impacts and near-instant death
The prosecution relied on events along Bedok Road and Changi Road, including overtaking and then slowing down to about 10mph, followed by the Morris car overtaking at about 50mph. The evidence was that the Ford Prefect first came into contact with the rear of the Morris car and then hit the front off-side mudguard, after which the Ford became unsteady and zig-zagged diagonally to the right into a head-on collision with the motorcycle. The motorcyclist died almost instantaneously, which supported the prosecution’s submission that the conduct resulted in death.
The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver knew the risk at the time
The prosecution position in the case was that knowledge of the consequences of the act resulting in death is an essential ingredient under Section 300(d). It argued that success required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew, when driving in that manner, that it was so imminently dangerous it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. The framing also emphasised that an act being imminently dangerous on its own is insufficient; murder requires proof of the accused’s knowledge at the time the dangerous driving was carried out.

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How does Section 300(d) of the Penal Code apply to dangerous driving?

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